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Abstract
Purpose Religious delusions are common and are con-
sidered to be particularly difficult to treat. In this study we
investigated what psychological processes may underlie
the reported treatment resistance. In particular, we focused
on the perceptual, cognitive, affective and behavioural
mechanisms held to maintain delusions in cognitive models
of psychosis, as these form the key treatment targets in
cognitive behavioural therapy. We compared religious
delusions to delusions with other content.
Methods Comprehensive measures of symptoms and
psychological processes were completed by 383 adult
participants with delusions and a schizophrenia spectrum
diagnosis, drawn from two large studies of cognitive
behavioural therapy for psychosis.
Results Binary logistic regression showed that religious
delusions were associated with higher levels of grandiosity
(OR 7.5; 95 % CI 3.9–14.1), passivity experiences, having
internal evidence for their delusion (anomalous experi-
ences or mood states), and being willing to consider
alternatives to their delusion (95 % CI for ORs 1.1–8.6).
Levels of negative symptoms were lower. No differences
were found in delusional conviction, insight or attitudes
towards treatment.
Conclusions Levels of positive symptoms, particularly
anomalous experiences and grandiosity, were high, and
may contribute to symptom persistence. However, contrary
to previous reports, we found no evidence that people with
religious delusions would be less likely to engage in any
form of help. Higher levels of flexibility may make them
particularly amenable to cognitive behavioural approaches,
but particular care should be taken to preserve self-esteem
and valued aspects of beliefs and experiences.
Keywords Psychosis  Schizophrenia  CBT  Cognitive
model
Introduction
Delusions are a cardinal feature of psychotic illness,
present in around three quarters of people with a schizo-
phrenia spectrum diagnosis [1, 2]. Religious themes are
common across delusion categories and types, with
between a fifth and two-thirds of all delusions reflecting
religious content [3–6]. To be classified as a religious
delusion, the belief must be idiosyncratic, rather than
accepted within a particular culture or subculture [7].
Strongly held beliefs that are shared within an existing
religious or spiritual context would not, therefore, be
considered to be religious delusions, irrespective of co-
occurring psychosis. For example, believing oneself to be
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able to hear the voice of Jesus is not uncommon in a
Christian society and thus would not in itself be classified
as a religious delusion. In contrast, believing oneself to be
inhabited by the warring spirits of multiple interspatial
deities, would be considered to be a religious delusion.
Culturally acceptable religious beliefs are cited as an
important coping strategy for many people with schizo-
phrenia, and may contribute to lower symptom severity in
both severe and enduring mental illnesses [8, 9] and
common mental disorders [10, 11]. Religious delusions, in
contrast, have routinely been linked to poorer prognosis for
people with psychotic disorders [12].
Levels of disability, distress and conviction have all
been reported to be higher in people with religious delu-
sions compared to other types of delusions [1, 3, 4, 13–15].
Religious delusions are also associated with poor engage-
ment, low satisfaction with services and with treatment,
and longer duration of untreated psychosis [12, 16–19].
People with religious delusions appear, therefore, to be a
particularly problematic group to treat effectively, and
ought to be targeted for psychological therapies [20, 21].
However, as the mechanisms underlying the treatment
resistance are poorly understood, further study is required
to establish what the particular foci of psychological
intervention for people with religious delusions should be,
and what issues are likely to arise in implementation.
Cognitive models of psychosis [22, 23] identify specific
psychological maintaining factors for delusions. Prominent
amongst these are persisting anomalous experiences, rea-
soning biases, affective processes, and poor adjustment to
psychosis resulting from personal beliefs about illness,
treatment and recovery. Religious delusions can be plau-
sibly linked to increased difficulty in all these areas.
Anomalous experiences These may be perceived as
having religious significance (e.g., communications from
higher powers) and thus be specifically attended to,
engaged with and even deliberately induced. Frequent
anomalous experiences provide repeated evidence to sus-
tain the delusion.
Reasoning biases Delusions are considered to arise
from, and be maintained by, biases and errors in evidence-
based reasoning. These include ‘jumping to conclusions’
(JTC) by making decisions based on limited data, and
belief inflexibility, comprising difficulty adjusting beliefs
in response to contradictory evidence; difficulty consider-
ing the possibility of being mistaken; and difficulty iden-
tifying plausible alternative explanations [24]. Faith, by its
nature, relies on foundations other than a systematic and
evolving evidence base, and religious or spiritual insights
tend to be based on revelation, dramatic events or inner
conviction, rather than a process of hypothesis testing. It is
also common, and, in some religions, even desirable, for
religious beliefs to be held with high conviction, certainty
of rectitude (rather than possibility of being mistaken), and
without alternatives. Should these features of religious
beliefs equally characterise delusions with religious con-
tent, reasoning biases may be particularly prominent, and
thus contribute to severity, persistence, and higher levels of
conviction.
Affective disturbance Affective processes are implicated
in the onset and maintenance of delusions by their impact
on attentional, perceptual, interpretative and memory pro-
cesses, and through maladaptive coping and affect regu-
lation strategies [25]. Religious delusions, by definition,
concern themes of universal existential import, and are
therefore likely to be particularly associated with strong
affect, with consequent cognitive-perceptual and behav-
ioural changes which may act to further increase delusion
severity [26].
Beliefs about illness, treatment and recovery How a
person makes sense of the changes associated with psy-
chosis is important to their adjustment and to their
engagement with treatment [27, 28]. Religious delusions
may be particularly likely to involve a rationale at odds
with the tradition of Western psychiatric empiricism that
characterises mental health services in the UK. This mis-
match of explanatory models may underpin the association
of religious delusions with poor engagement with treatment
and with services [28, 29].
Aims of the current study
We set out to compare a large sample of people with
religious delusions to people with other kinds of delusions
to identify the psychological factors which may contribute
to the increased persistence, disability and distress reported
to be associated with religious delusions. All participants
had current delusional symptomatology, and a schizo-
phrenia spectrum diagnosis verified by trained assessors.
The aim was to develop a better psychological under-
standing of religious delusions to inform model develop-
ment and, thereby, intervention.
We tested the following specific hypotheses:
1. In line with previous studies, people with religious
delusions will have higher levels of symptomatology
and delusional conviction, and poorer engagement in
treatment than people with other kinds of delusions.
2. People with religious delusions will have more anomalous
experiences, more negative affect and more reasoning
biases than people with other kinds of delusions.
3. People with religious delusions will have less insight
and more unhelpful attitudes towards their treatment
than people with other kinds of delusions.
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Methods
Participants
Participants in the present study were the combined sam-
ples from two studies by the psychosis research partner-
ship. The first was the psychological prevention of relapse
in psychosis trial (PRP, ISRCTN83557988). The PRP trial
was a United Kingdom multicentre randomised controlled
trial of cognitive behavioural therapy and family inter-
vention for psychosis [30]. The second was the cognitive
mechanisms of change in delusions (CMCD, ISRCTN
59501939) study. Both studies had ethical approval (South
East REC ref. 01/1/14; London Wandsworth REC ref.
07/H0803/140). Participants were recruited from National
Health Service Trusts in London and East Anglia and gave
informed consent prior to participation. The two studies
used the same inclusion criteria: a current diagnosis of non-
affective psychosis according to ICD-10 criteria (F20-29)
as assessed by trained raters using the schedules for clinical
assessment in neuropsychiatry (SCAN) [31]; aged between
18 and 65 years; positive psychotic symptoms of at least
moderate severity at the point of recruitment (as rated by
the SCAN). For the PRP trial, participants had to have
experienced at least one relapse; for the CMCD study, the
positive symptom needed to be a distressing delusion, held
with at least 50 % conviction over the last 3 months. The
following exclusions were applied in both studies: primary
diagnosis of alcohol or substance dependency; organic
syndrome or learning disability; inadequate command of
English to engage in assessments or psychological therapy
with an English speaking therapist; and, finally, unstable
residential arrangements (possibility of moving away
before the study end). A total of 424 participants were
included; 301 from the PRP trial, and the first baseline
cohort of 130 from the CMCD study (seven participants
took part in both studies, and they were excluded from the
PRP dataset, so that only their most recent data from the
CMCD trial were included in the current study). Of these,
383 had a current delusion (global delusion rating [1 on
the SAPS, see below) and formed the sample for the cur-
rent study.
Measures
Symptom severity
The scales for the assessment of positive and negative
symptoms [32, 33] were used to measure symptom severity
over the previous month in the following domains: hallu-
cinations, delusions, bizarre behaviour, positive formal
thought disorder, affective flattening, alogia, avolition–
apathy, anhedonia–asociality, and attention. Each domain
includes a global rating of severity, rated by an interviewer
on a Likert scale in the following way: 0 = none,
1 = questionable, 2 = mild, 3 = moderate, 4 = marked
and 5 = severe. For this study, the global ratings of each
domain were summed to give an indication of symptom
severity. Both of the measures are widely used, and have
good psychometric properties. The global rating of delu-
sions (item 20) was used to select participants with any
kind of delusion from the total sample, and the religious
delusions item (item 12) to identify whether or not par-
ticipants had a religious delusion. In each case, a rating of 2
(mild severity) or more was taken to indicate presence of
the delusion. Delusional conviction was rated using the
anchoring from the Psychotic Symptoms Rating Scales
(PSYRATS, [34]): 0 = no conviction at all, 1 = very little
conviction (\10 %), 2 = some doubts in conviction—
(10–49 %), 3 = conviction belief is very strong, between
50 and 99 %, and 4 = 100 % conviction. The PSYRATS
has good inter-rater reliability (intraclass correlation coef-
ficients range from 0.79 to 1.0).
Treatment engagement
Attitudes towards medication were assessed using the first
four items of the Medication Adherence Rating Scale
(MARS, [35]). A higher MARS score indicates higher
levels of medication adherence. Ratings of engagement in
CBT (2 = full therapy; 1 = partial therapy; 0 = no ther-
apy, [36]) and with services (rated on an 11 item scale,
from 1 (poor engagement) to 5 (good engagement), [37])
were available from those patients randomised to the CBT
intervention arm of the PRP trial only.
Anomalous experiences
SCAN ratings were used to create a dichotomous variable
denoting whether or not the participant had any halluci-
natory experiences in any modality. Ratings were also
made of whether the main source of evidence for the
delusional belief was internal (a mood state or anomalous
experience) or external (an external event).
Affect
The beck depression inventory-II (BDI-II, [38]) and beck
anxiety inventory (BAI, [39]) were used to assess concur-
rent emotional upset. Both are self-report 21-item, 4-point
scales (0–3). Anxiety is assessed over the past week with
the following severity ratings: 0–9 = normal, 10–18 =
mild to moderate, 19–29 = moderate to severe and
30–63 = severe. Depression is assessed over the past
2 weeks with the following anchors: 0–13: normal; 14–19:
mild depression; 20–28: moderate depression; and 29–63:
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severe depression. Both scales are widely used and have
excellent psychometric properties.
Reasoning
Two aspects of reasoning were assessed, belief flexibility
(BF) and the jumping to conclusions data-gathering bias
(JTC). BF comprises three components [40]. Two items are
from the Maudsley assessment of delusions (MADS, [41]):
whether the respondent believes there is a possibility that
they may be mistaken in their delusional belief (PM), rated
yes or no; and the respondent’s reaction to a ‘hypothetical
contradiction’, a convincing scenario which would refute
the delusional belief (RTHC), rated flexible (dismisses the
delusion, or believes it less) or inflexible (dismisses the
evidence, or changes the delusional belief to accommodate
the evidence). An additional measure of alternative
explanations of experiences (EoE, [42]) assesses whether
or not respondents can think of any other explanation at all
(except the delusional explanation) for the experiential
evidence they have listed in support of their delusion. The
MADS is a validated, structured interview schedule
designed to assess multiple dimensions of delusions, with
good inter-rater and adequate test–retest reliability [43].
JTC was assessed using two versions of the probabilistic
reasoning ‘beads’ task [44], which consists of presentations
of beads in a jar (arranged in an 85:15 or 60:40 ratio, using
two different colours). Beads are shown one at a time in a
predetermined order and participants are instructed to take
as many draws as they need to be certain of the jar of
origin. The JTC bias is defined dichotomously as a decision
after fewer than three beads [40, 44].
Insight and attitudes to treatment
Personal illness beliefs were assessed using two subscales
of the Illness Perceptions Questionnaire (IPQ, [45]):
timeline (three items) and possibility of cure-control (six
items), together with the two ‘internal’ cause items, relat-
ing to ‘state of mind’ and ‘personality’. These items have
been demonstrated to predict the uptake of psychological
therapy [28]. Each item is rated from 1 (strongly disagree)
to 5 (strongly agree), and psychometric properties are
good. Insight was measured using the first three items of
the scale to assess unawareness of mental disorder [46].
Each item was rated from 1 (good insight) to 5 (poor
insight). The scale is interviewer rated with good psycho-
metric properties.
Analysis
Analyses were conducted using IBM SPSS 20 for windows
(version 20). Significance tests were two-tailed. Item 12 of
the SAPS (religious delusions, RD) was used to dichoto-
mise the sample for the main analyses, using a cut off of 2
(ratings of ‘mild’ and above) to indicate the presence of a
religious delusion (RD group) or the absence of religious
delusions, but presence of any other delusion (other delu-
sions group). The association between delusions of other
types and religious delusions was assessed by binary
logistic regression, with the categorical coding of religious
delusions as the dependent variable and each remaining
delusion type as predictors. To assess differences between
participants with and without religious delusions, a series
of independent samples t tests were computed. Where two
dichotomous variables were tested against each other, Chi
Square (v2) tests were computed. Parametric assumptions
were met for all analyses with the exception of the t test for
the SANS Alogia score, for which a Satterthwaite adjust-
ment was carried out. Given the exploratory nature of the
study, no formal adjustment was made for multiple testing.
Significantly different variables were entered into a binary
logistic regression, with RD group (1 = RD group;
0 = other delusions group) as the dependent variable,
using a backward conditional selection procedure, to
identify a final model of the correlates of religious
delusions.
Results
Demographic characteristics and prevalence
of religious delusions
87 individuals (20.5 %) had religious delusions (RD). The
RD group did not differ from the other delusions group on
any demographic variable (Table 1). The prevalence rates
of all types of delusions in the sample are displayed in
Table 2. Binary logistic regression analyses revealed that,
compared to the other delusions group, and irrespective of
controlling for all other delusion types, people with RD
were six times more likely to also have grandiose delu-
sions, and three times more likely to also experience
delusions of being controlled (Table 2).
Hypothesis 1 People with religious delusions will have
more severe symptoms, higher delusional conviction and
show poorer engagement with treatment than people with
other delusions.
The RD group was characterised by higher levels of
positive symptoms, but lower levels of negative symptoms,
and similar levels of conviction, compared to those with
other delusions. The RD group scored more highly on
hallucinations, bizarre behaviour, formal thought disorder,
and, in negative symptoms, lower on alogia, avolition/
apathy and anhedonia/asociality. Effect sizes were small to
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medium. The RD group was as likely to engage with ser-
vices, with talking therapy, and with medication as those
with other delusions (Table 3).
Hypothesis 2 People with religious delusions will have
more anomalous experiences, more negative affect and
more reasoning biases than people with other delusions.
Table 1 Demographic and clinical characteristics of participants with religious delusions compared to those with other delusions
Total sample (n = 383) Religious delusions (n = 87) Other delusions (n = 296) t (df) p
Age (years)
Mean (SD) 38.9 (11.3) 38.9 (10.6) 38.9 (11.7) -0.03 (381) 1.0
Length of illness (years)
Mean (SD) 11.9 (9.6) 13.3 (10.4) 11.5 (9.4) -1.5 (375) 0.1
Total sample (n = 383) Religious delusions (n = 87) Other delusions (n = 296) v2 (df) p
Sex, n (%)
Male 266 (69) 60 (69) 206 (70) 0.01 (1) 0.9
Female 117 (31) 27 (31) 90 (30)
Ethnicity, n (%)
White 264 (69) 63 (72) 201 (68) 0.7 (2) 0.7
Black African/Caribbean/other 76 (20) 16 (18) 60 (20)
Asian/other 43 (11) 8 (10) 35 (12)
Diagnosis, n (%)
Schizophrenia 327 (85) 69 (80) 258 (87) 4.3 (2) 0.2
Schizoaffective disorder 43 (11) 15 (17) 28 (9)
Delusional disorder/other 11 (4) 2 (2) 9 (4)
Medication, n (%)a
None 8 (2) 1 (1) 7 (2) 5.0 (3) 0.2
Low 119 (32) 27 (32) 92 (32)
Medium 134 (36) 24 (29) 110 (38)
High 109 (29) 32 (38) 77 (27)
a Chlorpromazine equivalent, 0–200 = low; 201–400 = medium; [400 = high
Table 2 Binary logistic
regression showing the
prevalence of delusional
subtypes between participants
with religious delusions
compared to those with other
delusions (with percentage
prevalence rates for each group)
OR odds ratio, CI confidence
intervals
a Uncontrolled analyses suggest
RD group less likely to
experience persecutory
delusions (OR 0.4, 95 % CI
0.3–0.8, p = 0.004)
b No association in
uncontrolled analyses (OR 1.5,
95 % CI 0.7–2.9, p = 0.2)
Delusion subtype Age prevalence (%) OR 95 % CI p
Total sample
(n = 383)
Religious
delusions
(n = 87)
Other delusions
(n = 296)
Persecutory delusions 80 69 83 0.7a 0.3–1.2 0.2
Delusions of reference 68 71 67 1.0 0.5–1.8 0.9
Delusions of mind reading 40 48 38 1.4 0.8–2.5 0.3
Delusions of sin and guilt 12 16 11 2.2b 1.0–4.8 0.04
Grandiose delusions 30 59 21 6.2 3.5–11.1 \0.001
Religious delusions 21 100 0
Thought insertion 20 26 19 1.1 0.5–2.4 0.8
Somatic delusions 19 21 18 1.0 0.5–2.1 0.8
Thought broadcast 18 21 17 0.9 0.4–2.0 0.8
Delusions of being controlled 18 29 15 3.1 1.5–6.2 0.002
Thought withdrawal 7 10 6 1.2 0.4–3.3 0.8
Delusions of jealousy 2 1 2 0.6 0.1–5.8 0.7
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The RD group was more likely to have hallucinations in
any modality, and to have internal, rather than external evi-
dence for their delusions. Effect sizes were small. Levels of
negative affect were similar between groups. The RD group
did not show more severe reasoning biases than those with
other delusions, rather, they were slightly more likely to have
access to an alternative explanation (Table 4).
Hypothesis 3 People with religious delusions will be
characterised by less insight and more negative attitudes
towards treatment than people with other delusions.
The RD group did not differ from the Other Delusions
group on any insight or illness perception subscore, or on the
total scores (Table 4). Scores on these attitudinal measures of
engagement were consistent, therefore, with the results for
the actual take-up of treatment, as tested in hypothesis One.
Post hoc analysis: correlates of religious delusions
The categorical variables of grandiose delusions, delusions
of being controlled, access to an alternative explanation,
and having internal evidence for the delusion were entered
into a Binary logistic regression analysis, together with the
global ratings of hallucinations, bizarre behaviour, formal
thought disorder, alogia, anhedonia/asociality, and avoli-
tion/apathy, with religious/other delusion as the dependent
Table 3 Psychotic symptoms,
delusional conviction and
engagement scores in
participants with religious
delusions compared to those
with other types of delusions
SAPS/SANS scale for the
assessment of positive/negative
symptoms, PSYRATS Psychotic
Symptoms Rating Scales, MARS
Medication Adherence Rating
Scale, CBT cognitive
behavioural therapy, ES effect
size, Cohen’s d [55]
a Only available for data from
CBT intervention arm of PRP
trial
b Satterthwaite adjustment
carried out
Variable Religious
delusions
(n = 87)
Other
delusions
(n = 296)
t, ES (d) df p
Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
SAPS positive symptoms
SAPS total 9.3 (2.7) 8.0 (3.1) -3.5, 0.4 378 \0.001
Hallucinations 3.1 (1.7) 2.6 (1.8) -2.2, 0.3 379 0.03
Delusions 4 (0.8) 3.8 (0.8) -1.9, 0.2 381 0.06
Bizarre behaviour 1.1 (1.1) 0.7 (1.0) -2.6, 0.4 381 \0.01
Formal thought disorder 1.2 (1.2) 0.9 (1.3) -2.0, 0.3 380 \0.05
SANS negative symptoms
SANS total 6.7 (4.3) 7.9 (4.4) 2.3, -0.3 379 0.02
Affective flattening 1.0 (1.4) 1.1 (1.3) 0.4 381 0.7
Alogia 0.4 (0.9) 0.6 (1.1) 1.8, -0.2 168b 0.04
Anhedonia–asociality 2.1 (1.5) 2.4 (1.5) 2.0, -0.2 380 0.04
Attention 1.2 (1.1) 1.4 (1.6) 1.3 380 0.2
Avolition–apathy 2.0 (1.4) 2.4 (1.4) 2.2, -0.3 381 0.03
Conviction
PSYRATS score 3.3 (0.9) 3.1 (1.1) -1.5 376 0.1
Religious
delusions
(n = 87)
Other
delusions
(n = 296)
t, ES (d) df p
Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
(n = 49) (n = 137)
Engagement
Engagement scale total scorea 41.2 (6.2) 40.9 (6) -0.3 184 0.89
MARS total score 2.8 (1.3) 2.9 (1.2) 1.1 353 0.3
Variable Religious
delusions
(n = 87)
Other
delusions
(n = 296)
v2 df p
Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
(n = 21) (n = 66)
Uptake of CBTa, n (%)
None 6 (28.6) 14 (21.2) 0.6 2 0.7
Some 7 (33.3) 27 (40.9)
Full 8 (38.1) 25 (37.9)
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variable. The final model (step 5) was a good fit
(v2 = 67.6, df = 6, p \ 0.001), with an estimated pseudo
r2 of 0.3. Grandiose delusions, delusions of being con-
trolled, Internal evidence and access to an alternative
explanation each independently increased the likelihood of
having a religious delusion, with effect sizes ranging from
over seven times as likely, to twice as likely. Each step
increase in avolition/apathy scores reduced the likelihood
Table 4 Anomalous
experiences, affect and
reasoning biases in religious
delusions compared to other
types of delusions
BDI beck depression inventory,
BAI beck anxiety inventory,
JTC jumping to conclusions,
IPQ Illness Perceptions
Questionnaire, ES effect size,
r [55]
a Only available for data from
PRP trial
Variable Religious delusions (n = 87) Other delusions (n = 296) v2, ES (r) df p
n (%) n (%)
Anomalous experiences
Yes 66 (75.9) 182 (61.7) 5.9, 0.1 1 0.02
No 21 (24.1) 113 (38.3)
Internal state
Yes 72 (90) 204(80.3) 4.0, 0.1 1 0.05
No 8 (10) 50 (19.7)
External state
Yes 46 (57.5) 173 (68.7) 3.4 1 0.07
No 34 (42.5) 79 (31.3)
Variable Religious delusions (n = 87) Other delusions (n = 296) t df p
Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Affect
Depression (BDI) 21.9 (12.4) 23.7 (13.4) 1.1 373 0.3
Anxiety (BAI) 21.5 (14.6) 20.6 (13.6) -0.5 359 0.6
Variable Religious delusions
(n = 87)
Other delusions
(n = 296)
v2 df p
n (%) n (%)
Reasoning biases
JTC on 85:15 task
Yes 36 (55) 108 (47) 1.3 2 0.2
No 30 (45) 124 (53)
JTC on 60:40 task
Yes 25 (38) 79 (35) 0.3 1 0.6
No 41 (62) 150 (65)
Alternative explanation
Yes 27 (34) 52 (21.1) 5.6, 0.1 1 0.02
No 52 (66) 195 (78.9)
Possibility of being
mistaken
Yes 41 (50) 123 (48) 3.9 2 0.1
No 41 (50) 133 (52)
Variable Religious delusions (n = 87) Other delusions (n = 296) t df p
Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
Illness perceptionsa
IPQ cure/control 21.2 (4.3) 20.5 (405) -1.0 221 0.3
IPQ timeline 9.7 (3.5) 9.8 (3.3) 0.2 224 0.8
IPQ state of mind 3.6 (1.3) 3.6 (1.3) -0.2 243 0.9
IPQ personality 3.4 (1.3) 3.4 (1.3) -0.1 243 0.9
Variable Religious delusions (n = 87) Other delusions (n = 296) t df p
Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
(n = 58) (n = 175)
Insight scalea 8.3 (4) 8.2 (3.9) -0.5 231 1.0
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of having a religious delusion by 20 %. Bizarre behaviour
made a small contribution, at a trend level. Results are
presented in Table 5.
Discussion
We set out to examine the psychological correlates of the
higher levels of persistence, distress and disability reported
in the literature to be associated with religious delusions.
Our aim was to understand the perceptual, emotional,
cognitive, and behavioural processes underlying the treat-
ment resistance, to better inform cognitive behavioural
interventions.
In this large sample, around a fifth of delusions was
religious in content. We found that religious delusions were
associated with higher levels of positive symptoms, audi-
tory and other hallucinations, thought disorder, bizarre
behaviour and passivity phenomena. People with religious
delusions also reported more internal evidence for their
delusions (anomalous experiences or mood changes), and
were very likely to have an accompanying grandiose
delusion. In contrast to findings in the literature [1, 3, 4,
13–19], they had lower levels of negative symptoms, with
no differences in their degree of delusional conviction or in
the likelihood of them engaging in treatment. Levels of
affective disturbance were similar in RD compared to other
delusions, and reasoning biases were, if anything, less
pronounced in the religious delusions group, as people with
religious delusions were more likely to be able to identify
an alternative to their delusion. The groups did not differ in
their levels of insight, engagement or in their beliefs about
treatment.
It is possible that by selecting participants for the current
study who were already to some degree treatment resistant
(history of relapse, or of symptom persistence), some of the
differences found between those with religious delusions
and those with other delusions in studies based on unse-
lected samples were minimised. Nevertheless, our findings
suggest that levels of positive symptoms, and specifically
of grandiosity and anomalous experiences, including
passivity phenomena, are elevated in people with religious
delusions, even when compared to an otherwise similarly
‘unwell’ group. These characteristics could plausibly
underlie the persistence of religious delusions and their
resistance to treatment. There was no evidence that any
other hypothesised maintaining factor was differentially
elevated, or that beliefs about treatment were more nega-
tive in the religious delusions group. This is surprising as
grandiose beliefs were prominent in the group, and are
characterised by a greater likelihood of reasoning biases
[47]. As with accompanying persecutory delusions in
Garety and colleagues’ study, it is possible that accompa-
nying religious delusions act to moderate the cognitive and
affective biases that are characteristic of grandiose delu-
sions. The religious delusions group overall was no more
likely to experience paranoid delusions than the group with
no religious delusions.
Greater grandiosity may in itself be a block to treatment
[1]; in that professionals may be hesitant to intervene
because of the apparently protective effects of the delusion,
or because of low levels of distress. Nevertheless, despite
the co-occurrence with grandiosity, our findings suggest
that beliefs about treatment and engagement are no dif-
ferent in people with religious delusions, compared to any
other delusion, and, therefore, that a range of interventions
should be offered. Indeed, the greater likelihood of gen-
erating an alternative to the beliefs raises the possibility
that people with religious delusions may be particularly
amenable to cognitive behavioural therapy. There was no
evidence from our sample to suggest that this, or any other
treatment offered, would be particularly unacceptable to a
religious delusions group.
Considering the severity of psychotic symptomatology
amongst religiously deluded patients, they may also benefit
from being offered a review of their medication. Despite
experiencing positive symptoms to a greater degree, med-
ication levels, measured by CPZ equivalents, were no
different in the religious delusions group compared to
people with other kinds of delusions, and over 60 % were
on a ‘low’ or ‘medium’ dose of medication. This is a crude
index, and may simply represent avoidance of over-pre-
scribing, but as the group did not demonstrate poor insight,
or negative attitudes to medication, the possibility of
improving outcomes by optimising pharmacological inter-
ventions should also be considered, and may act syner-
gistically with psychological therapy.
Clinical implications
We found that religious delusions were more likely to be
accompanied by grandiose delusions, and high levels
of positive symptomatology, including hallucinations,
passivity phenomena, and unusual behaviour. Within a
Table 5 Final model of the binary logistic regression analysis illus-
trating the predictors of religious delusions
Independent variable OR 95 % CI p
Grandiose delusions 7.5 3.9–14.1 \0.001
Delusions of being controlled 3.2 1.5–6.6 0.002
Bizarre behaviour 1.3 1.0–1.7 0.07
Avolition/apathy 0.8 0.6–1.0 0.02
Alternative explanations 2.2 1.1–4.2 0.02
Internal evidence 3.4 1.3–8.6 0.01
OR odds ratio, CI confidence intervals
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cognitive model of religious delusions, persistence of dis-
tress and disability and poorer outcomes may, therefore, be
driven by high levels of ongoing evidence for the delusion
in the form of anomalous experiences. It is possible, if the
experiences have religious significance, that the person
engages in particular behaviours to bring these experiences
on. The high levels of bizarre behaviour found in our
sample would be consistent with this suggestion. Bizarre
behaviour may also act to alienate the person and reduce
opportunities for social support and potential disconfirma-
tion through social contact; or form a safety behaviour,
preventing testing out of concerns [48, 49]. Odd behaviours
may also act directly to confirm delusions by generating
unusual or adverse reactions from others. High levels of
grandiosity may limit the person’s ability to reflect upon,
and consider, both their actions, and their explanations of
experiences. Grandiose delusions may have positive
implications which mean the person is reluctant to change
them.
Our findings suggest that in therapy with people with
religious delusions, particular emphasis should be placed on
the nature of ongoing evidence. Alternative explanations for
this are likely to be available, but care may be required to
ensure that valued and potentially self-esteem enhancing
aspects of the belief, and those associated with positive
religious coping [50, 51], are not modified in an unhelpful
way, and that interventions are genuinely collaborative and
carefully targeted on distress and disability. Attentional
processes are also likely to be an important target, aiming to
reduce unhelpful tendencies to look out for, and to focus on,
anomalous experiences. Some negotiation, and discussion
of pros and cons, may be required around behaviours which
are causing difficulty or placing the person at risk, if their
negative impact is not recognised by the service user. The
role of particular behaviours in triggering or maintaining
anomalous experiences, or reducing the possibility of dis-
confirmation should be considered.
Limitations
This study adopted a cross sectional design and thus no
causal relationships can be established. Cultural factors
were not a focus of either main study, so despite their
importance to RD, they could not be considered in this
investigation. Multiple tests were carried out, and, although
the sample size is large, only the global positive symptom,
delusion and bizarre behaviour differences remain signifi-
cant after Bonferroni correction. The findings should,
therefore, be taken as pointers for future research, which
should specifically target participants with RD to recruit in
sufficiently large numbers.
Future research
Clarification of possible cultural variations in the psycho-
logical mechanisms underpinning religious delusions
would be a useful area for future research. Researchers
have proposed a distinction between African-Caribbean
patients and other ethnic groups in their religious activity
and belief levels [52], and the incidence of psychosis is
itself influenced by racial and cultural characteristics [53].
Testable predictions arise from the tentative cognitive
model of religious delusions proposed. Further research is
required to clarify levels of engagement with and
appraisals of anomalous experiences in people with reli-
gious delusions, and the impact of experiences and
appraisals on behaviour. More work is needed to under-
stand the difference between socially acceptable religious
beliefs and religious delusions, particularly the factors
determining the helpfulness or otherwise of a belief [54].
Conclusions
Approximately one-fifth of people with delusions have
religious delusions. Their attitudes to and levels of
engagement with treatment are similar to those of people
with any kind of delusion, and therefore efforts should be
made to optimise both psychological therapies and pre-
scribing. Cognitive therapy may be an especially good ‘fit’,
with adaptations to specifically target high levels of posi-
tive symptoms, particularly anomalous and passivity
experiences, and their impact on behaviour, in the context
of grandiosity. A cognitive model of religious delusions
needs to incorporate an understanding of the differential
impact of religious belief compared to religious delusion,
and the role of anomalous experiences. Such experiences
may be valued, rather than distressing, and care should be
taken to understand and to preserve life-enhancing aspects
of beliefs, to promote a personally meaningful recovery.
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